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ABSTRACT
The lessening of tensions between the United States and
the Soviet Union have brought about projected reductions in
defense spending and attendant manpower drawdowns. However,
manpower analysts and policymakers in the Department of
Defense and the services' secretariates are faced with
frequent changes in world events--witness Iraq's invasion of
Kuwait--that portend threats to the interests of the United
States. At the same time, the supply--and demographic
complexion--of American youth that is available to fill
manpower needs is changing.
This thesis examines changing labor force, demographic,
and social trends into the early 21st century, focusing on 18
to 24 year-olds--the military's traditional source of
accessions. Census Bureau, Bureau of Labor Statistics and
Defense Manpower Data Center statistics are used, along with
recent legislation, to make projections concerning the
availability of quality youth for the services' recruiting
efforts. Recommendations are made concerning policies to
continue attracting and retaining quality personnel for the
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Determining military manpower demands for the 1990s, and
how they will be met, is directly related to perceived threats
to the national security and the composition of the armed
forces required to protect our interests. Manpower analysts
and policymakers in the Department of Defense (DOD) and the
services' secretariates are faced with frequent changes in
world events and attendant threats to our national security.
At the same time, the supply--and demographic complexion--of
American youth that is available to fill manpower needs is
changing.
B. ANALYSIS
Few prognosticators, if any, anticipated the events of
late 1989 in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. The fall
of the Berlin Wall, adoption of democratic political systems
in Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary, and the reunifica *on
of Germany have altered our perception of the primary threat
to our national security. Development of a nuclear triad to
counter the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact had demanded
substantial numbers of ballistic missile submarines, land-
based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and manned
bombers. Significant land forces supported by armor,
artillery, attack aircraft, and carrier battle groups also
1
were needed to protect Western Europe. Those same carrier
battle groups and Marine amphibious groups were to serve as
"policemen" to counter smaller threats to the nation's
interests abroad.
With the apparent demise of both the Soviet Union and the
Warsaw Pact as a threat to the United States and its allies,
a "peace dividend" was anticipated by many Americans. The
fears of a decline in the youth population impacting directly
on recruiting and retention efforts seemed to be passe.
Indeed, as 1990 dawned, few expected that Iraq would invade
Kuwait in August, bringing the fhreat of a major land war to
the Arabian peninsula. With of tensions in one venue and an
intensifying of tensions in another, what course will U. S.
defense strategy be taking in the next decade? Answering this
question is of paramount importance in determining future
manpower requirements, and it is one of the primary issues
addressed in this thesis.
Military manpower demands and the composition of defense
forces are based on DOD's Total Force Policy and can be
directly related to budget dollars and Congressionally-
mandated endstrengths. [Ref. l:p. II-1] The process that
leads to that outcome is complex, however. Threat assessment
begins in the Planning, Programming and Budget System (PPBS)
of the Department of Defense. Concurrence with the Joint
Chiefs of Staff and the services' secretariates results in
Program Decision Memoranda, which are submitted to the
2
executive branch for consideration in the President's dezense
budget. The legislative process involved in final approval
of the budget is tedious and may result in significant
changes, particularly in major spending programs. As of the
writing of this paper (late 1990), the Congress has mandated
manpower endstrength reductions for all of the services for
fiscal 1991, with further projected reductions through fiscal
1995. As Tables 1.la and 1.Ib illustrate, force reductions
of almost five percent are mandated for fiscal 1991, with
cumulative projected reductions of around twenty-two percent
by fiscal 1995. The Army and Air Force are hardest hit of the
four services, which is a reflection, in part, of conventional
force reductions in Europe.
TABLE 1.la
MILITARY FORCE LEVELS BY SERVICE, FISCAL
1990 AND 1991
FY 90 FY 91 REDUCTION % CHANGE
Army 744,170 702,170 42,000 - 5.6
Navy 590,500 570,500 20,000 - 3.4
Air Force 545,000 510,000 45,000 - 6.4
Marine Corps 196,735 193,735 3,000 - 1.5
Totals 2,076,405 1,976,405 100,000 - 4.8
Source: House and Senate Armed Services Committees, Fiscal
1990 and 1991 Defense Appropriation Bills
3
TABLE 1.lb
MILITARY FORCE LEVELS BY SERVICE,
FISCAL 1990 AND 1995
FY 90 FY 95 Reduction % Change
Army 744,170 520,000 224,170 - 30.1
Navy 590,500 501,000 89,500 - 15.2
Air Force 545,000 415,000 130,000 - 23.9
Marine Corps 196,735 177,000 19,735 - 10.0
Totals 2,076,405 1,613,000 463,405 - 22.3
Source: House and Senate Armed Services Conanittees, Fiscal
1990 and 1991 Defense Appropriation Bills
While tensions have intensified in the Persian Gulf
region, it is too early to prognosticate what effects this
conflict might have on projected manpower reductions beyond
fiscal 1991, especially since events are fluctuating on almost
a daily basis.1 Nonetheless. the mood of the country, and the
sense of Congress, at the writing of this paper suggests that
military manpower requirements will continue to decline for
the next several years. The Persian Gulf crisis may delay or
slow the decline, but is unlikely to reverse it.
Consequently, meeting those requirements in the face of a
1in the short run this will depend on whether a war breaks out
in the region. In the long run it depends on whether the U.S. and
its allies, or the U.N., decide to maintain a permanent
peacekeeping force in Saudi Arabia.
4
declining youth population--while maintaining the quality
2
necessary to man an increasingly technologically advanced
military--remains an important issue to address. The
Department of Defense has attracted higher quality recruits
in the last decade, and has a goal of maintaining or improving
the quality of military personnel to sustain better training,
performance, and improved readiness. (Ref. 1:pp. I1-8 and
iV-iO]
For manpower analysts and decision makers, the lesson is
clear. If the United States is to remain a "superpower," it
must be prepared to respond to threats to our national
security short of nuclear war. The requirement for sizable
numbers of ground forces that can be mobilized quickly with
adequate firepower and air support is crucial in responding
to limited, "low-intensity" conflicts. (Ref. 2:pp. 172-191]
The ability to project power ashore--particularly in Third
World arenas--should remain a hallmark of our national defense
strategy. To Captain Dick Diamond, USN, head of the Strategy
and Concept Branch of Naval Operations (OP-603), "The 1990s
version of the national military strategy will emphasize the
importance of conventional deterrence and responding quickly
to occasional conflicts with troublemakers around the globe."
(Ref. 3:p. 18]
2A "quality" recruit is defined as one who possesses a high
school diploma and scores at or above the 50th percentile on the
Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT).
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Projections to the year 2000 indicate that manpower
resources for the military are undergoing substantial change.
Given proposed force drawdowns, the decreasing number of 18
to 24 year-olds--the military's primary recruiting population-
-has not been considered to present a problem. On the other
hand, recent events in the Persian Gulf region have cast some
uncertainty on the feasibility of precipitously reducing the
active-duty military. Should the military be faced with
manpower requirements less than those of the mid- to late-
eighties, though, there still remains the question of
attracting and retaining highly qualified personnel from a
shrinking pool of potential accessions.
Immigration, particularly of Asians and Hispanics, will
become a major source of future labor force growth. In
addition, disadvantaged youth will become a greater proportion
of the 18 to 24 year-old pool. [Ref. 4:pp. 66-73] As the
military moves toward the 21st century, increased technology-
-in weapons and support equipment--will demand well-educated
technicians to sustain readiness. These demands will be
mirrored in the private sector, as the economy shifts from a
heavily industrial and manufacturing mode to one that is
service-oriented. (Ref. 4:pp. 24-26] Consequently, it will
be more difficult than ever for the military to compete for
quality personnel in the years to come.
The perceptions that youth have about the military are
more nebulous, but also exercise a significant impact on
6
recruiting and retention efforts. In an era of budget crisis
and force drawdowns, service in the military may not be
perceived as representing a stable career. On the other hand,
crises--such as the one in the Persian Gulf--can stimulate
interest in the military if national policies are supported
by a majority of the electorate. However, should the conflict
begin in earnest, youth may be less inclined to enlist, and
their parents less inclined to permit them to enlist, after
seeing the carnage "up close and personal" on the nightly
news.
Future retention issues also must be addressed. To ensure
maintaining current retention levels, it will become
increasingly important for the military to retain a positive
impression regarding quality of life issues. Parity, or near-
parity, with civilian wages and benefits, including the
provision educational benefits, child care, remedial training,
and retention/advancement opportunities will take on even
greater importance. A perception that the advantages of a
military career are less certain will make retention efforts
very difficult, particularly if wages and retirement benefits
have eroded.
C. FINDINGS
The widespread belief that a "peace dividend" is
inevitable appears to be premature. There is no question,
however, that defense spending will continue to decline
over the next decade. In the wake of those reductions, we
7
cannot lose sight of the competition the military must face
for quality personnel from private industry, colleges,
universities and other civilian training providers. It is
crucial, therefore, that disproportionate cuts not be made in
those manpower-related programs that have made the All-
Volunteer Force a success.
The purpose of this thesis, therefore, is to examine DOD
manpower requirements--as projected through the year 2000--
and to analyze and propose policies that will ensure meeting
those requirements, given anticipated trends in a dynamic
labor force, demographics of the population, and social
values. The main purpose of the thesis is to review the known
projections and trends, and to explore the possible implica-
tions for manpower procurement, retention, and force
structure. It is expected that this study will assist
policymakers responsible for recruiting and retention
by identifying expected changes in manpower supply
amd areas of future concern in both recruiting and retention
policies. Proposals will be made not only for solutions to
potential problems, but also for areas in which we feel
further study is warranted.
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II. HISTORICAL RECRUITING PATTERNS
A. PRINCIPLES OF SELECTION IN THE MILITARY
Recruits in the modern, All-Volunteer Force (AVF) must
meet a variety of physical, mental, and moral qualifications.
Although "brain" is not a sole substitute for "brawn", young
people who apply to serve in the armed forces are subjected
to rigorous testing in the form of the Armed Forces
Qualification Test (AFQT). As discussed in the introduction,
the services are continuing to attract high quality recruits,
particularly as measured by the AFQT. Table 2.1 provides a
break-down of AFQT Categories with corresponding percentile
score ranges.
TABLE 2.1
ARMED FORCES QUALIFICATION TEST (AFQT) CATEGORIES











Since 1980, the percentage of accessions that fall in AFQT
categories I through IIIA has risen from approximately 38
percent to 65 percent (Figure 2.1). This proportion of
"quality" accessions is not expected to decline significantly,
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Figure 2.1
Percentage of Mon-Prior Service accessions in AFQT Categories I -
IlIA Fiscal 1973 - 1989
Another measure of quality in a recruit is possession of
a high school diploma. As Figure 2.2 illustrates, the
proportion of high school diploma accessions has increased
from approximately 70 percent to 90 percent DOD-wide, another
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Figure 2.2
Percentage of Non-Prior Service accessions with a high school
diploma, Fiscal 1973 - 1989
While the quality standards of new recruits is either
increasing or--at the very least--holding steady own, it is
important to remember that service in the armed forces is a
responsibility. (Ref. 6:p. 1] While the draft era emphasized
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the concept of the "citizen soldier" and an attendant duty to
serve, the era of the (AVF) has tended to reduce stratifica-
tion. No longer is the officer corps the sole preserve of
white males; no longer are blacks and Filipinos able to serve
only as stewards; no longer are women relegated to nursing
and other "traditionally female" billets. In fact, the goal
of the services today is to be representative of the populace
as a whole within practical limits. This is in keeping with
the view that sharing in the responsibility of national
service should be borne by all members of society in a
reasonably equitable manner. [Ref. 6:p. 3]
B. WOMEN AND MINORITIES
The birth of the (AVF) caused some concerns about possible
shortfalls among male recruits. Increasing the role of women
in the armed forces seemed to be a logical means to fill any
shortfalls. As Figure 2.3 illustrates, representation by
women DOD-wide has remained fairly constant for the last ten
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Figure 2.3
Women as percentage of Non-Prior Service accessions, by
Service, Fiscal 1973 - 1989
There is no lack of representation in the military by
minorities, particularly blacks. In fact, the services have
been a leader in implementing equal employment opportunity.
As Figure 2.4 shows, black accessions have remained in the 20
13
percent range for the past ten years. By comparison, the
percentage of blacks in the U.S. population is also presented.
Except for the Air Force, the proportion of black accessions
in the services tends to exceed the proportion of blacks in
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Figure 2.4
Blacks as percentage of Non-Prior Service accessions, by
Service, with civilian comparison group,
Fiscal 1973 - 1989
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Another potential source of minority recruiting is the
Hispanic population. As Table 2.2 shows, though, Hispanic
recruits have been generally underrepresented in the military.
In particular, in fiscal 1989, only about 6 percent of the
services' accessions were Hispanic, compared with 11 percent
of the 18-24 year-old population. [Ref. 6:p. 21]
TABLE 2.2
HISPANIC/NON-HISPANIC BACKGROUND OF NON-PRIOR SERVICE
ACCESSIONS, BY SERVICE, AND CIVILIANS 18-24 YEARS OLD,
Fiscal 1989 (PERCENT)
18-24
Hispanic/ Marine Air Year Old
Non-Hispanic Army Navy Corps Force DoD Civilians
Hispanic 6 8 7 3 6 11
Non-Hispanic 94 92 93 97 94 89
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100
Source: [Ref. 6:p. 22)
C. GEOGRAPHIC MIGRATION
A shift of the populace to the "sun belt" has resulted in
increases in accessions in the South and West regions of the
United States, with corresponding declines in the North
Central and Northeast regions. As Figure 2.5 illustrates,
15
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Figure 2.5
Non-Prior Service accessions by geographic region,
Fiscal 1973 - 1989
Table 2.3 reveals some insights into the regional
composition of 1989 accessions. While there was a degree of
uniformity in the percentage of accessions in Tier I (high
16
TABLE 2.3
SELECTED STATISTICS FOR NON-PRIOR SERVICE ACCESSIONS
BY REGION, DIVISION, AND STATE COMPARED
WITH CIVILIANS 18-24 YEARS OLD, FISCAL 1989
Area's Area's Percentage
CENSUS REGION Percentage Percentage Represen- of Mean
CENSUS DIVISION of All UPS of All 18-24 tation Accessions AFQT
STATE Accessions Year Olds Ratio in Tier I Percentile
NORTHEAST REGION 14.15 20.80 0.68 92.1 59.0
New England Division 3.20 5.47 0.59 91.6 60.8
Maine 0.54 0.44 1.22 91.? 60.8
New Hampshire 0.39 0.41 0.95 89.9 65.4
Vermont 0.20 0.17 1.17 92.0 62.3
Massachusetts 1.16 2.59 92.1 59.5
Rhode Island 0.21 0.40 0.54 89.8 61.2
Connecticut 0.68 1.45 0.47 92.3 59.5
Middle Atlantic Division 10.9r 15.33 0.71 92.2 58.5
New York 5.06 ;. . .65 90.4 58.4
New Jersey 1.52 3.20 0.47 92.7 57.8
Pennsylvania 4.37 4.38 1.00 94.2 58.8
NORTH CENTRAL REGION 25.90 24.95 1.04 92.4 58.8
East North Central Division 18.28 17.58 1.04 92.7 58.1
Ohio 5.21 4.65 1.12 93.5 57.7
Indiana 2.43 2.19 1.11 92.5 58.8
Illinois 4.18 5.02 0.83 92.2 56.7
Michigan 4.53 3.94 1.15 92.6 57.9
Wisconsin 1.93 1.77 1.09 91.7 61.9
West North Central Division 7.62 7.37 1.03 91.8 60.3
Minnesota 1.47 1.85 0.79 92.0 62.5
Iowa 1.24 1.06 1.17 93.3 61.6
Missouri 2.'t 2.22 1.09 90.5 57.9
North Dakota 0.29 0.25 1.13 96.2 62.1
South Dakota 0.39 0.28 1.38 92.1 62.2
Nebraska 0.80 0.60 1.32 94.2 60.8




CENSUS REGION Percentage Percentage Represen- of Mean
CENSUS DIVISION of Al NPS of A]l 18-24 tation Accessions AFQT
STATE Accessions Year Olds Ratio in Tier I Percentile
SOUTH RECION 40.29 33.65 1.20 92.2 56.3
South Atlantic Division 18.77 16.43 1.14 92.1 56.7
Delaware 0.20 0.30 0.68 93.9 56.6
Maryland 1.66 1.90 0.87 93.3 57.6
D.C. 0.17 0.26 0.68 94.1 50.1
Virginia 2.52 2.33 1.08 92.7 58.0
West Virginia 1.00 0,71 1.41 92.4 56.7
North Carolina 2.81 2.62 1.07 94.4 54.2
South Carolina 1.79 1.27 1.41 92.9 53.0
Georgia 3.06 2.55 1.20 93.0 54.0
Florida 5.54 4.49 1.23 89.5 60.1
East South Central Division 7.46 6.44 1.16 92.2 54.4
Kentucky 1.79 1.48 1.21 91.2 56.5
Tennessee 2.02 2.38 0.85 92.0 56.3
Alabama 2.22 1.48 1.50 92.7 53.1
Mississippi 1.43 1.09 1.31 93.2 51.0
West South Central Division 14.06 10.79 1.30 92.4 56.9
Arkansas 1.39 1.01 1.38 92.3 55.4
Louisiana 2.52 1.80 1.40 92.6 53.4
Oklahoma 1.64 1.27 1.30 92.6 58.0
Texas 8.51 6.72 1.27 92.3 58.0
WEST REGION 19.67 20.60 0.95 91.0 59.7
Mountain Division 6.54 5.13 1.27 91.8 60.6
Montana 0.54 0.27 2.01 92.5 63.6
Idaho 0.58 0.34 1.67 91.4 92 T
Wyoming 0.30 0.18 1.73 95.5 62.5
Colorado 1.67 1.23 1.36 92.4 61.3
New Mexico 0.92 0.61 1.52 91.7 56.8
Arizona 1.56 1.30 1.20 90.4 60.8
Utah 0.51 0.73 0.69 92.7 58.3




CENSUS REGION Percentage Percentage Represen- of Mean
CENSUS DIVISION of All NPS of All 18-24 tation Accessions AFQT
STATE Accessions Year Olds Ratio in Tier I Percentile
Pacific Division 13.13 15.47 0.85 90.6 59.2
Washington 2.20 1.51 1.46 91.2 62.6
Oregon 1.47 0.98 1.49 89.4 63.2
California 8.98 12.50 0.72 90.4 57.9
Alaska 0.18 0.17 1.06 91.8 60.0
Hawaii 0.29 0.30 0.97 96.3 53.1
UNITED STATES SUBTOTAL 100.00 100.00 1.00 92.0 58.0
Source: [Ref. 6:pp. 38-39]
school diploma graduates) across census divisions, and little
difference in mean AFQT percentiles, the representation
ratio 3 varied considerably. The states with the highest
representation ratios in 1989 tended to be those states
with the highest unemployment rates.4 This seems to prove an
intuitive maxim amongst recruiters: as unemployment goes up,
3Reiresentation ratios are the percentage of enlisted
accessions divided by the percentage of civilian youth in each
area. A 1.00 ratio means that the area has the same proportion of
accessions as of the youth population. A ratio <1.00 means fewer
youths, proportionally, enlist in the military; a ratio >1.00 means
more youths, proportionally, enlist.
4Those states with the lowest representation ratios--
Massachusetts, Connecticut, Rhode Island, and New Jersey had 4.0,
3.7, 4.1 and 4.1 percent unemployment rates (respectively); those
with the highest ratios--Alabama, Oregon, Washington, Idaho,
Montana and New Mexico--had 7.0, 5.7, 6.2, 5.1, 5.9, 6.3 and 6.7
percent unemployment rates (respectively) while the national
average was 5.3 percent in 1989.
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of non-prior service (NPS) accessions roughly equal to their
share of the 18-24 year-old populace. The South, on the other
hand, provides about 40 percent of all NPS accessions while
only having about 34 percent of the 18-24 year-old populace.
Conversely, the Northeast Region only provides about 14
percent of the populace while having some 21 percent of the
18-24 year-old populace.
As we look at historical regional5 recruiting patterns by
individual service--as shown in Tables 2.4 through 2.7--we see
strong similarities in regional accession patterns.
TABLE 2.4
PERCENTAGE OF ARMY NON-PRIOR SERVICE ACCESSIONS
BY REGION, 1979 TO 1989
REGION 1979 1980 1891 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
NE 26.4 28.3 26.0 24.0 28.2 24.6 25.2 24.5 22.6 20.2 20.0
MW 20.7 22.5 27.5 25.2 32.3 28.7 27.9 26.9 24.7 26.0 24.4
S 36.5 33.3 34.2 25.9 36.1 33.4 32.9 33.9 35.4 38.5 40.0
W 16.4 15.9 12.3 24.9 3.4 13.3 14.0 14.7 17.3 15.3 15.6
Source: Defense Manpower Data Center
5Census Bureau geographic regions consist of the
following states:
Northeast (NE): NY, MA, PA, CN, NH, ME, VT, NJ, RI
Midwest (MW): OH, IN, IL, MI, WI. MN, IA, MO, ND, SD. NE, KS
South (S): DE, MD, DC, VA, WV, NC, SC, GA, FL, KY, TN, AL,
MS, AR, LA, OK, TX
West (W): MT, ID, WY, CO, NM, AZ, UT, NV, WA, OR, CA, AL, HI
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For the Army, the South showed the growth that has been
observed for the other services, rising from about 36 percent
of accessions to 40 percent. The West did not experience any
real growth, remaining in the mid-teens--with the exception
of 1983, which appears to be an anomaly. What may be of the
most interest is that the Midwest has continued to provide 25
to 30 percent of the Army's accessions; not unexpectedly, the
Northeast region has declined from the mid- to high- teens to
only 20 percent in 1989.
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TABLE 2.5
PERCENTAGE OF NAVY NON-PRIOR SERVICE ACCESSIONS
BY REGION, 1979 TO 1989
REGION 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
NE 35.7 34.1 34.7 36.0 34.4 33.5 33.3 32.4 29.6 29.5 26.6
MW 25.8 27.0 28.2 28.7 27.6 28.1 27.5 27.1 28.1 28.5 27.0
S 19.9 18.8 18.4 17.7 19.1 18.8 19.9 19.E 20.5 21.1 25.3
W 18.6 20.1 18.7 17.6 18.9 19.6 19.3 20.9 21.8 20.9 21.1
Source: Defense Manpower Data Center
For the Navy, a significant decline was observed in the
Northeast from about 35 percent in 1979 to around 27 percent
in 1989; and the contribution of the South increased from
roughly 20 percent in 1979 to 25 percent in 1989. The West
has hovered around the 20 percent mark throughout the period
from 1979 to 1989, with the Midwest region holding generally
constant in the high-twenties.
TABLE 2.6
PERCENTAGE OF AIR FORCE NON-PRIOR SERVICE ACCESSIONS
BY REGION, 1979 TO 1989
REGION 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
NE 24.5 23.5 23.7 23.1 23.4 23.3 23.3 20.4 21.2 17.8 16.2
MW 28.6 29.6 28.7 29.7 29.6 28.9 29.9 27.0 25.7 24.5 25.3
S 31.1 31.0 31.3 30.4 30.7 30.9 31.1 31.5 33.2 36.9 36.1
W 15.8 15.9 16.3 16.8 16.3 16.9 15.7 21.1 19.9 20.8 22.4
Source: Defense Manpower Data Center
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Again, the Air Force shows growth in the South and West,
a decline in the Northeast, with the Midwest staying fairly
stable in the high- twenties.
TABLE 2.7
PERCENTAGE OF MARINE CORPS NON-PRIOR SERVICE ACCESSIONS
BY REGION, 1979 TO 1989
REGION 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
NE 23.9 22.6 22.9 23.1 22.2 22.2 21.8 18.9 17.9 17.6 16.9
MW 22.9 24.7 25.7 26.9 27.4 28.5 26.8 27.4 26.4 26.8 25.8
S 35,7 35.2 32.8 33.6 32.3 32.0 33.5 35.3 37.7 37.0 38.4
W 17.5 17.5 18.6 16.4 18.1 17.3 17.9 18.4 18.0 18.6 18.9
Source: Defense Manpower Data Center
The Marine Corps shows moderate increases in th South and
West, the Midwest holding its own, and the Northeast experi-
encing the declines that have been experienced by the other
services. Of some interest is the fact that in 1989 well over
one-third of non-prior service accessions came from the South
region for all services except the Navy--its accessions were
fairly balanced across the four regions.
D. SUMMARY
To sumnarize historical recruiting patterns, we see the
following:
- The percentage of "quality" new accessions has increased
over the past decade, and there is every indication that
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enlistment standards and qualitative goals in that area
will either remain constant or increase in the near
future.
- Women in the armed forces continue to be under-
represented; however, expended participation of this group
is possible.
- Among minorities, blacks are overrepresented, while
Hispanics continue to be under-represented--providing
another untapped resource for the future.
- Geographic migration to the "sun belt"--the West and
South--has provided the services with the majority of
their recruits in recent years. Nevertheless, only the
South provides more than its "fair share" in the sun
belt, which may be economically related to unemployment.
The opportunity to tap the other growing region, the West,
may be possibile; the traditionally recruiting-poor
Northeast--which also has a declining population.
It appears that the services will continue to strive to
be representative of the populace, at least for the near
future. Increasing roles for minorities and women in the
military seem inevitable as these groups contribute signifi-
cantly to the pool of available, qualified applicants in the
1990s and beyond. It is equally important to acknowledge that
personnal quality does not have to be sacrificed to retain
approximate population representation in the military.
With declining recruiting budgets, the services will have
to "recruit smart." No longer will it be acceptable policy
to simply flood highly populated areas with recruiters and
offices. Regional migration is shifting the "bodies",
granted, but economic realities--particularly in those states
hit hardest by recession--must be taken into consideration as
well. A representation ratio for a particular group is not
always linked to unemployment. Indeed, it may be that youth
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in Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut, New York, and New
Jersey have been traditionally underrepresented in the armed
forces. To expend significant dollars and person-hours in
those states may provide a challenge in recruiting, or a
lesson in futility, and should be a topic for further
research.
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III. LABOR FORCE TRENDS
A. PROJECTIONS
"I never think of the future. It comes soon
enough."
- Albert Einstein
The Bureau of Labor Statistics has developed three
alternative projections for population growth to the year
2000: low, moderate, and high. Under the moderate projec-
tion, the major labor force trends are:
1. The overall labor force, which numbered 83 million
in 1970, is expected to be 70 percent larger in 2000--but the
growth rate has been decelerating. Labor force growth
rates by major age groups are shown in Table 3.1 below:
TABLE 3.1
GROWTH RATES OF U. S. LABOR FORCE
BY MAJOR AGE GROUPS, SELECTED PERIODS, 1970 - 2000
(PERCENT)
Age Groups (Years) 1970-80 1980-88 1988-2000
16-24 3.6 -1.4 0
25-54 2.8 3.0 1.6
55+ .4 0 1.2
TOTALS 2.6 1.6 1.2
Source: [Ref. 9:p. 2]
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2. The percentage of blacks in the labor force is
projected to increase to 12 percent by 2000, compared with
11 percent in 1988 and 10 percent in 1976.
3. The percentage of Hispanics will increase as a share
of the labor force to 10 percent by 2000, compared with only
7 percent in 1988.
4. The percentage share of Asians and other groups will
increase from 3 to 4 percent of the work force by 2000.
5. The median age of the labor force is aging. While the
median age in 1988 was 35.9 years, by 2000 it is expected to
be 39.3 years.
6. Labor force -iowth is expected to continue to remain
slow between 1)o and 2000. The annual growth rate is
anticipated o be 1.2 percent for the balance of the decade,
while it was 2 percent between 1976 and 1988.
7. The labor force is expected to increase by a net addi-
tion of 19 million persons by 2000, compared with the net
addition of 25 million from 1976 to 1988.
8. Women are projected to increase as a proportion of the
labor force from 40 percent in 1976 to 47 percent by the year
2000.
9. The percentage share of the youth populace (between
the ages of 16 and 24) in the labor force, which decreased
from 24 percent in 1976 to 19 percent in 1988, is projected
to fall even further to 16 percent in 2000. [Ref. 8:pp. 3 &
10)
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B. THE YOUTH LABOR MARKET
The slowing of labor force growth is primarily due to two
major factors: changes in the population and labor force
participation rates. In the Census Bureau's "lowest"
projections, the U.S. population is expected to grow to about
264 million through 2020, then begin to decline to 185 million
in 2080. [Ref. 8] This slowing reflects the end of the "baby
boom" generation6 . (Ref. 9:pp. 4-51
By the late 1970s, the "baby boom" generation had entered
the work force and, as a group, had reached the prime working
ages (25 to 54) by the year 1990. [Ref. 9:p. 4] The year
2000 will be the last year that the entire baby boom genera-
tion is in the prime working age group, and this group will
steadily decline as a share of the population thereafter.
However, the children of the baby boom generation,
characterized as the "echo effect,"7 will enter the labor
force during the 1990s. This suggests that the younger labor
force population--between 16 and 24--will increase steadily
6The "baby boom" generation is comprised of those born between
1946 and 1964. The peak year for baby-boomers turning 18 years old
-- the military's prime recruiting pool -- was 1979.
The "baby bust" generation begins with the end of the baby boom in
1965.
7The "birth dearth" is the U.S. fertility rate below the
replacement level of 2.1 births per woman. The "echo effect" is
the increase in the annual number of births of the baby boom
generation women in there child-bearing years. The increase is due
to their being more women in this generation, even though these
women are having fewer children. For a complete discussion, see
Ben J. Wattenberg's The Birth Dearth, Pharos Books, New York, NY,
1987.
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between 1988 and 2000. [Ref. 9:pp. 4-51 The trough years--
those years in which the growth is slowed--for various youth
age groups are shown in Table 3.2.
TABLE 3.2
YOUTH LABOR FORCE TROUGH YEARS, BY AGE GROUP, FOR THE 1990S
AGE GROUP YEAR OF TROUGH
16 1990
16 and 17 1991
18 and 19 1993
20 and 21 1995
18 to 24 1996
Source: [Ref. 9:p. 51
As Table 3.2 shows, increases in the youth population by
individual age groups will not occur uniformly throughout the
1990s. However, by the start of the 21st century, the total
youth population--16 to 24--will be increasing. [Ref. 9:pp.
4-51
The aging of the "baby boom" generation will cause the
number of children under the age of five to decline from 1988
to 2000. [Ref. 9:p. 51 The "echo effect" will result in an
increase in children between the ages of five and thirteen
through 1996, and then will decline. Teenagers--14 to 17
years--will decline by about 700,000 in 1990, then increase by
about two million by the year 2000 as shown in Table 3.3.
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TABLE 3.3
PROJECTED YOUTH POPULATION BY AGE GROUP,
1988 AND 2000 (IN MILLIONS)







Source: [Ref. 10:p. 18]
As the data suggest, there will be strong enrollment in
elementary and middle schools through the turn of the century,
with an increase in high school enrollment in the near future.
The overall effect of the "baby boom" has been to change
the distribution or composition of the labor force. The
result is that the share of the labor force 16-24 years old
will be smaller in 2000 than in 1988, with 25-54 year-olds
comprising a larger segment.
A change in labor force participation rates is the second
major factor causing the slow growth of the labor force.
Recent trends have changed labor force participation rates
for older workers, young women, and black men. [Ref. 9:p. 6]
Older workers should increase as a proportion of the labor
force as those born in the 1930s and early 1940s reach ages
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over 55. Over the 1977-88 period, the labor force participa-
tion rate for 55- to 64-year-old men dropped by 7.3 percentage
points. However, the participation rate is expected to rise
by 1.1 percent per year during the 1988-2000 period. [Ref.
9:p. 6] Older women are expected to increase their participa-
tion, but at a much lower rate than men.
The high growth rates in labor force participation for
women are projected to continue to slow through 2000, as shown
in Table 3.4.
TABLE 3.4
LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION GROWTH RATES
FOR WOMEN, BY AGE GROUP, SELECTED PERIODS, 1976 TO 2000
(PERCENT)
AGE GROUP 1976-85 1985-88 1988-2000
(YEARS)
20-24 1.1 .4 .6
25-29 2.1 1.0 .9
Source: [Ref. 9:p. 7]
The trends show a marked slowdown in young women's participa-
tion rates as well as increased participation by older women
in the labor force.
Finally, the participation rates for black men--25 to 54
years old--are projected to rise during the 1988-2000 period,
as shown in Table 3.5.
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TABLE 3.5
LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION GROWTH RATES
FOR BLACK MEN, BY AGE GROUP, SELECTED PERIODS 1976 TO 2000
(PERCENT)
AGE GROUP 1976-85 1985-88 1988-2000
(YEARS)
25-34 -2.1 0.5 0.3
35-44 -0.1 -1.6 0.8
45-54 0.6 0.5 0.1
Source: [Ref. 8:p. 7]
C. ENTRY LEVEL SHORTAGES
The labor force is expected to grow by a net increase--
entrants minus leavers--of approximately 19 million persons,
with 43 million joining the labor force between 1988 and 2000.
It is projected that labor force entrants will be:
- comprised of slightly more women than men;
- 72 percent white, non-Hispanics;
- 15 percent Hispanic, with more Hispanic men than women;
and
- 13 percent black, with slightly more black women than
men.
Further, approximately 70 percent of those projected to be in
the work force in 2000 are currently in the work force. [Ref.
9:p. 7] This only serves to reaffirm the notion that the
labor force will continue to age.
Great concern has been reported regarding "shortages" of
entry-level workers, particularly in geographic areas that
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currently have low unemployment rates. (Ref. ll:p. 71]
Competition among institutions--like the military, colleges
and universities, and industry--will continue to be vigorous
throughout the 1990s for entry-level workers between the ages
of 16 to 24. The competition for this market has already
intensified. In a recent Time article, it was reported that
two of the largest fast-food chains are offering numerous
incentives for teenage employees, including cash bonuses,
college scholarships, a tuition-free fifth college year, and
new career paths. (Ref. 5:pp. 17 and 18] Universities and
industry are also stepping-up marketing efforts to recruit
older workers, women, and part-time workers. (Ref. 5:p. 18]
The New York Times reports that employers are already offering
"higher wages and new creative fringe benefits to attract
young workers"; "hiring workers under age 16"; "luring older
workers out of retirement"; "increasing labor productivity";
and "moving to labor surplus areas." [Ref. 12:p. 2]
D. SKILL MISMATCHES
The shortages discussed above refer to shortages of the
quantity of workers needed. But shortages of qualified
workers may pose an even greater problem in the future.
Projected changes in the occupational structure of
employment through this decade include the following:
1. One-half--8.7 out of 18 million--of all new jobs
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added will be in the service-producing industries that
encompass health, business, personal, and recreational
services. [Ref. 10:p. 26]
2. Health care and business services will continue to be
the most important industry sectors of the economy. Seven of
the ten fastest growing occupations are health-related. One
of every six new wage and salary jobs will be in business
services. [Ref. 10:pp. 26-29]
3. Each of the three major occupational groups requiring
the highest levels of education--(executive, administrative,
and management; professional specialty; and technicians and
related support occupations)--are expected to grow more
rapidly than the growth rate for total employment. [Ref.
10:pp. 42-43]
4. Employment is projected to increase faster in cicupa-
tional groups requiring more, rather than less, education.
[Ref. 13:p. 63]
5. Among the major occupational groups, those projected
to show above-average growth rates are the highly-skilled
groups. Those occupational groups showing below-average
growth rates are the less skilled groups. [Ref. 11:p. 69]
6. Educational requirements for occupations with faster
growth rates--managerial, professional, and technical
occupations--are higher; while the requirements for occupa-
tions with the slowest growth rates--operators, fabricators,
and laborers--are lower. [Ref. 11:p. 69]
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7. In general, workers will continue to be required over
a broad spectrum of educational experience. However, the
better paying jobs will require some post-secondary education
or training. [Ref. 13:p. 63]
The prospect for future skill mismatches is already
present in today's labor market. Two-thirds of employers
consulted in a recent survey found that the current pool of
entry-level job applicants were insufficiently prepared in
basic skills. [Ref. 12:p. 2]
According to former Labor Secretary Elizabeth Dole, "The
jobs of the next decade will be more complex, requiring a
higher level of reasoning and basic skills". [Ref. 12:p. 3]
So concerned was Secretary Dole about future job requirements
and skills of workers that she established a Special
Commission on Achieving Necessary Skills (SCANS). The
Commission's charter was to prepare a report recommending
national policies to prepare high school youths for entry into
the labor market. [Ref. 14 :p. 4]
E. SUMMARY
The labor force of the next decade--and beyond--is
changing. As our work force ages and fewer young workers
enter the workplace, there will be challenges to the military,
colleges and universities, and private industry. Seeking out
educated, skilled, entry-level workers will become a prime
concern as their numbers are not increasing at the rate
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required to meet the demand for their services. Moreover,
shortages in skilled and educated workers are emerging as a
major problem. Both types of shortages bear important
implications for the military's recruiting and training




It was noted above that racial and ethnic minorities are
projected to represent an increasing share of the U.S. labor
force through the year 2000. "One third of new entrants into
the labor force over the next decade will be minority group
members, more than half of whom are being raised in poverty."
[Ref. 15:p. 3] Furthermore, blacks and Hispanics are
currently over-represented in occupations that are projected
to grow slowly or decline. [Ref. 11:p. 72] Blacks and
Hispanics are also 35 percent more likely than whites to be
employed in jobs projected to lose the most employees over the
next decade. [Ref. 15:p. 3]
At the same time, lower scores on educational achievement
tests [Ref. 11:p. 71] and lower high school completion rates
for Hispanics and blacks [Ref. 16:p. 9] indicate that many
are not prepared for the advanced education and training
needed occupations with the faster growth rates. Indeed, this
raises considerable concern, not only because Hispanics are
becoming one of the fastest growing components of the labor
force, but also because "under varying assumptions, Hispanic
persons could account for between 20 and 54 percent of the
U.S. population growth over the next 25 years." [Ref. 5:pp.
3-41
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This demographic trend is a consequence of traditionally
higher fertility rates among minority women than among white
women. [Ref. 17 :p. 77] These changes are most evident now
in the youth population. For instance:
1. In New York State, 40 percent of all elementary and
high school students are either racial or ethnic minorities,
this and will approach 50 percent in just ten years. [Ref.
18:pp. 3-4]
2. Fifty-three percent of the children enrolled in
California public schools are racial or ethnic minorities--
33 percent Hispanic, 11 percent Asian or other, and 9 percent
black--making white school children a minority (47 percent).
[Ref. 18:p. 4]
3. Asians (and "others") are the fastest growing minority
group, rising from 1.6 percent of the population in 1985 to
3 percent in 2010. By the year 2000, California alone will
have as many Asian-Americans as there were in the entire U.S.
in 1985. [Ref. 5:p. 8]
B. IMMIGRATION
It is a commonplace observation that America is a country
of inigrants. America was created by immigrants of virtually
all nationalities, and it continues to attract immigrants from
many countries. By virtue of over 200 years of immigration,
the economies and dual histories of other countries are
intertwined with the growth and development of the American
system. [Ref. 19:p. 1]
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Further, it has been predicted that by the year 2000, more
than half of all new workers in the labor force will be
minorities; half of these will be immigrants, especially
Hispanics, who have grown five-times as fast as the rest of
the population. [Ref. 20:p. 47] Julian L. Simon, in his
book, Economic Consequences of Immigration, states: "VWe no
longer get immigrant workers from the more advanced, indus-
trialized nations; and, despite Immigration and Naturalization
Service efforts to prevent the unskilled workers we do get
from becoming a welfare burden, our newer immigrants are
falling below the poverty line in even greater numbers."
[Ref. 7:p. 25]
Several immigration trends that will affect future
military manpower requirements are:
1. Annual documented immigration to the year 2000 will
total approximately 560,000 annually. [Ref. 9:p. 4]
2. One of the assumptions in the mid-range projection of
the Bureau of the Census is that the Immigration Reform and
Control Act, which was not fully implemented until the end of
1988, will reduce the number of undocumented aliens.
Therefore, it is projected the number of illegal or
undocumented aliens will drop from 200,000 in 1988 to 100,000
in 1998. [Ref. 9:p. 4]
3. In the year 2000, the projected immigrant male
population, ages 15 to 19, will total 370,000, a 30 percent
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increase over the 1985 population in this age group. [Ref.
17:p. 76]
4. Immigrants are typically young adults (age 15 to 24)
who have a strong negative effect on youth wages, especially
minority youth wages, and a weak negative effect on youth
employment rates. [Ref. 21:pp. 1-2]
5. It has been reported that by 1987, less than four
percent of immigrants were admitted to the U.S. because of
skills or occupations." [Ref. 21:p. 2] Most who entered
legally did not enter to fill the U.S. job skills require-
ments, but entered under the family reunification category.
[Ref. 11:p. 71]
The future labor force composition will be strongly
affected by the total number and skill level of immigrants who
will be competing with American youth for entry-level jobs.
Skilled immigrants will also serve as substitutes for those
skilled, aging members of the existing workforce. [Ref 21:p.
2]
C. REGIONAL MIGRATION
Immigration is a common fact that is close to the
experience of many Americans. As a country comprised
primarily of immigrants, we place a high value on the freedom
of internal mobility. [Ref. 9:p. 1] During the first decade
of the (AVF), the geographical distribution of accessions
from each region remained fairly stable. [Ref. 6:p. 35]
However, as Chapter II has shown, substantial changes in the
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distribution of accessions by geographic region has occurred
since the late 1970s.
The Census Bureau provides four alternative series of
projections of the population of the 50 states and the
District of Columbia for 1989 through 2010. The four
alternative series of population projections for each state
are based on different assumptions of future internal
migration. While trends in all of the components of popula-
tion change are subject to variation, and future trends are
not easily predicted, internal migration is the most
problematic in state-level projections. [Ref. 32:p. 1]
Additionally, given the sensitivity of internal migration to
changes in economic conditions, international migration,
mortality, and fertility, internal migration changes can be
both rapid and sizable.
Each of the projection series present results from
different assumptions about future trends in the components
of population change. None of the projections is intended as
a forecast of future population, nor do they represent an
exhaustive set of possible outcomes. The range of population
projections for individual states in the four series varies
widely between the four series of estimates and depends
largely on internal migration.
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The four assumptions on internal migration are summarized
below:
1. Series A is a modified linear trend of the patterns
of state-to-state migration observed from 1975 through 1988.
It encompasses a trend analysis using all of the historical
data, yet puts a limit on the most trended values. It is a
composite method that attempts to combine four objectives,
which are:
a. To use a long-time period so that random or
abnormal fluctuations in the rates average out;
b. To use the most recent data available to reflect
recent shifts in a state's migration patterns;
c. To continue recent changes in the migration rates
so that emergent trends are captured; and
d. To force convergence in the migration rates so
that a return to some equilibrium value is assured.
2. Series B is the average of the state-to-state
migration rates observed from 1975 to 1988. It is a straight-
forward approach based upon the average--mean of the entire
period--conditions over the longest time period (i.e., a
state-to-state internal migration rate is equal to the
arithmetic mean of its historical data set).
3. Series C is the average of the state-to-state
migration rates observed from 1985 through 1988. This series
uses the mean of the 1985 to 1988 time period--the most recent
data--in an attempt to smooth abnormal fluctuations. It
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assumes that each state-to-state rate equals the arithmetic
mean of the historical data for years 1985-86, 1986-87, and
1987-88. Series C emphasizes recent changes that may signify
lasting shifts in patterns of net migration.
4. Series D assumes zero net internal migration. This
series shows what would occur to a state's population solely
from the effects of fertility, mortality, and international
migration alone. It provides a basis from which to measure
the effects of any other projection that does include internal
migration. [Ref. 32:pp. 3-10]
Table 4.3 shows the projections of the total resident
population by region from 1989 to 2010, for each of the four
series. Table 4.4 displays the corresponding percentages of
the total population for each region.
TABLE 4.3
PROJECTIONS OF THE TOTAL RESIDENT POPULATION OF U.S.
REGIONS, BY SERIES 1989 TO 2010 (IN THOUSANDS)
REGION 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 19"5 2000 2005 2010
SERIES A
NE 50695 50850 51011 51175 51341 51504 51665 ;2419 53124 53801
M 60089 60288 60443 60556 60636 60687 60712 60528 60110 56696
S 85545 86517 87485 88445 89389 90317 91227 95575 99678 103529
W 51404 52237 53045 53826 54582 55311 56015 59226 62174 65030
SERIES B
NE 50631 50707 50777 50841 50896 50941 50976 51005 50897 50763
MW 60025 60205 60374 60528 60669 60798 60914 61342 61668 61997
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TABLE 4.3 (CONTINUED)
REGION 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 2000 2005 10
S 85624 86644 87636 88600 89534 90440 91317 95382 99101 102577
w 51453 52336 53197 54034 54848 55641 56412 60019 63421 66719
SERIES C
NE 50684 50814 50938 51056 51166 51266 51357 51662 51825 51961
mw 60072 60296 60510 60706 60889 61058 61213 61815 62289 62744
S 85547 86489 87404 88291 89149 89979 90781 94483 97857 101008
W 51431 52292 53132 53949 54744 55517 56269 59788 63114 66344
SERIES D
NE 59868 51179 51481 51767 52043 52304 52553 53583 54371 55028
mw 50286 60723 61148 61552 61940 62312 62665 64231 65584 66824
S 85304 85998 86673 87325 87950 88553 89132 91750 94113 96318
W 51277 51990 52684 53357 54013 54649 55271 58186 61018 63886
Source: [Ref. 32:pp. 15-18]
TABLE 4.4
PROJECTIONS OF THE PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL RESIDENT POPULATION
OF U. S. REGIONS, BY SERIES, 1989 TO 2010
REGION 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 2000 2005 2010
SERIES A
NE 20.46 20.35 20.24 20.15 20.06 19.98 19.90 19.58 19.31 19.07
mw 24.26 24.13 23.99 23.84 23.69 23.54 23.38 22.61 21.85 21.16
S 34.53 34.62 34.72 34.82 34.92 35.03 35.14 35.69 36.24 36.71
w 20.75 20.90 21.05 21.19 21.33 21.45 21.58 22.12 22.60 23.06
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TABLE 4.4 (CONTINUED)
REGION 199 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 2000 2005 2010
SERIES B
NE 20.44 20.29 20.15 20.01 19.89 19.76 19.64 19.05 18.50 18.00
MW 24.23 24.09 23.96 23.83 23.70 23.58 23.46 22.91 22.42 21.98
S 34.56 34.68 34.78 34.88 34.98 35.08 35.17 35.62 36.03 35.37
W 20.77 20.94 21.11 21.28 21.43 21.58 21.73 22.42 23.05 23.65
SERIES C
NE 20.46 20.33 20.21 20.10 19.99 19.88 19.78 19.30 18.84 18.42
MW 24.25 24.13 24.01 23.90 23.79 23.68 23.58 23.09 22.64 22.25
S 34.53 34.61 34.69 34.76 34.83 34.90 34.97 35.29 35.57 35.81
W 20.76 20.93 21.09 21.24 21.39 21.54 21.67 22.32 22.95 23.52
SERIES D
NE 20.53 20.48 20.43 20.38 20.33 20.29 20.24 20.01 19.77 19.51
MW 24.34 24.30 24.27 24.23 24.20 24.17 24.14 23.99 23.84 23.69
S 34.43 34.41 34.40 34.38 34.36 34.35 34.33 34.27 34.21 34.15
W 20.70 20.81 20.90 21.01 21.11 21.19 21.29 21.73 22.18 22.65
Source: [Ref. 32:pp. 15-18]
Series A is considered to provide the best "snapshot" look
of projected regional migration trends because it encompasses
a trend analysis and places extra weight on the moot recent
value. The suummary of Series A regional projections for 1989
to 2010, as shown in Tables 4.3 and 4.4 indicate some general
trends:
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1. The South will continue to be the most populous
region, with over one-third of the total U.S. population
projected to reside in that region.
2. The West will continue to be the fastest growing
region followed by the South.
3. The Midwest region will continue to be the third
fastest-growing region.
4. The Northeast will continue to be the slowest growing
region of the United States.
D. SUMMARY
The projections for the balance of this decade and into
the 21st century show that the population of the United States
will become even more ethnically and racially diverse.
Indeed, a considerable increase in the labor force will come
from immigrants--primarily Hispanics and Asians--with blacks
comprising an ever-greater proportion of the workforca as
well. While immigrants and minorities become a larger part
of our labor pool, we also see shifts in the population--away
from the northeast and northcentral regions of the country,




The "baby boom" generation is a highly educated generation
that is passing through its peak child-bearing and child-
rearing years, and is now entering its peak earning years.
Positive educational trends include:
1. The Bureau of the Census reports that the level of
educational attainment has been steadily increasing for
persons 25 years and older. [Ref. 31:p. 6]
2. Between 1975 and 1985, there was a decline in the
proportion of black and Hispanic students at each level of
education--elementary, high school, and college. [Ref. 15:p.
13]
3. Fourteen nations, including the U.S., have reported
massive IQ gains--up to 25 points--over a single generation.
[Ref. 5:p. 9)
4. Since 1980, the proportion of 16- to 24- year-olds
who reported dropping out of school has declined. These
dropout rate reductions have occurred regardless of race;
however, blacks and Hispanics still had higher dropout rates
than did whites in 1985. [Ref. 22:p. 55]
On the negative side:
1. Since 1983 there has been a downward shift in
Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT) scores, particularly in the
verbal portion. This trend has leveled off somewhat in the
1980s. [Ref. 22:p. 69]
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2. Test results show that American students, on the
average, do not write well. Out of a possible score of 400,
the average scores were 158 for 4th graders, 205 for 8th
graders, and 219 for 11th graders. Students who spent more
time watching television had lower writing achievement test
scores than did those who watched less. [Ref. 22:p. 61]
3. In a 1981-82 international math comparison test of 8th
grade students from 18 countries and provinces, the U.S.
ranked 9th in arithmetic, 11th in algebra, 16th in measurement
(above only Nigeria and Swaziland), 15th in geometry, 6th in
statistics, and 13th overall. [Ref. 22:p. 64]
4. A 1985 literacy skills and reading test of young
adults found that most young adults adequately perform tasks
requiring basic literacy skills; however, nearly one-half are
unable to do well at tasks of even moderate complexity--such
as balancing a checkbook or using a map. [Ref. 22:p. 67]
5. "In a 1989 survey of 17 countries, 9th graders from
the U.S. tied with students from Singapore and Thailand for
14th place in science achievement." [Ref. 23:p. 3]
6. In a recent assessment of mathematics and 3cience,
carried out by the Educational Testing Service, the U.S.
ranked in the lowest grouping among 13 year-olds tested.
[Ref. 24:p. 70]
7. Nearly one-fifth of 163 large companies reported that
they are having problems finding people who can read well
enough to qualify for an entry-level job. [Ref. 25:p. 8B]
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Some analysts believe the U.S. could lose its already
tenuous economic leadership by the end of the century because
it has a " . . . shortfall of people in the work force with
the reading, writing, and math skills required for today's
jobs." [Ref. 25:p. 8B]
As previously mentioned, the most rapid occupational
growth is expected in occupations that require some
postsecondary education or training. For example, health and
business services--both of which are projected to have
significant job growth in the next twenty years--require that
most of their employees have specialized training and
education. Yet, the "evidence suggests that the work-force
skills of many youngsters are declining at a time when new
jobs are becoming increasingly sophisticated." [Ref. 25:p.
8B]
Analysis of occupational employment projections have
indicated that blacks and Hispanics are overrepresented in
occupations with the slowest rates of projected growth.
Conversely, they are underrepresented in occupations projected
to have the fastest rates of growth. [Ref. 13:p. 69]
Additionally, "the decline in literacy is true of all
demographic groups, but is particularly so for blacks and
Hispanics." [Ref. 11:p. 70] These facts heighten the concern
that the education and training preparation of blacks and
Hispanics is inadequate to meet the more demanding jobs of the
future. The trends also indicate a dearth of individuals
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possessing the prerequisite skills to seek necessary
postsecondary education or training.
Because Hispanics are one of the fastest growing com-
ponents of the labor force, their low high school completion
rates cause considerable concern. [Ref. 22:p. 52] As is
shown in Table 5.1, high school completion rates for Hispanics
have not increased much during the 1975-86 period; and there
is no tendency seen in narrowing the gap. [Ref. 11:p. 71]
TABLE 5.1
EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT RATES FOR HISPANICS, BY LEVEL
OF EDUCATION COMPLETED, 1975 TO 1986
<4 YRS 4 YRS H.S. 4 YRS H.S. & 4YRS tOLL
YEARS OF H.S. ONLY SOME COLL OR MORE
1975 48.3 30.7 12.2 8.8
1980 42.1 34.8 15.4 7.7
1985 39.0 34.0 16.0 11.0
1986 41.0 33.7 16.3 9.0
Source: [Ref. 4:p. 71]
Indeed, there appears to be good reason for some analysts
to believe that the U.S. could lose even more of its economic
leadership to Europe or Asia before the end of this century.
[Ref. 25:p. 8B] America's rate of productivity has grown at
a much slower rate in the past 10 to 15 years. [Ref. 26:p.
18] Education and training of the labor force play an
important role in determining productivity growth. The
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potential educational shortfall--and its negative implications
for our productivity--highlight the importance of meeting high
educational requirements. The decline in the abilities of the
youth population implies that a smaller portion of the youth
labor pool possesses the educational background to be trained
in jobs that are becoming increasingly "high tech". [Ref.
17:p. 74]
B. APTITUDE
"The primary focus of enlistment screening has gradually
shifted from physical/medical criteria to measures of aptitude
and education." (Ref. 27:p. 13] As advances in technology
accelerate, soldiers and sailors are being called upon to
"operate more sophisticated weaponry and perform duties that
demand comparatively greater skills in mechanical compre-
hension, arithmetic reasoning, problem-solving, and verbal
fluency." [Ref. 27:p. 13]
The Random House College Dictionary defines "aptitude" as:
"capability; innate or acquired capacity for something;
talent; readiness in learning; intelligence." The military,
on the other hand, defines it primarily as a score on the
Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB). The ASVAB
is composed of ten subtests which are used to measure general
military trainability and to assess vocational aptitude for
specific job categories. [Ref. 17:pp. 14-15] The index of
general military trainability is the Armed Forces Qualifi-
cation Test (AFQT) which was discussed in Chapter I.
51
In addition to the AFQT, the services also combine
subtests to predict job training success. These aptitude
composites are used primarily to determine vocational aptitude
for entry into specific military occupations and "determining
basic eligibility for entry into certain services." [Ref.
17:p. 17]
Table 5.2 shows how the various education and aptitude
requirements for military enlistment affect the population of
"eligible" men and women between the ages of 18 and 23.
TABLE 5.2
PERCENT OF U.S. POPULATION AGED 18 TO 23 ELIGIBLE FOR3
ENLISTMENT BASED ON FISCAL 1984 EDUCATIONAL AND APTITUDE
STANDARDS, BY SERVICE AND SEX
SEX ARMY NAVY AIR FORCE MARINES
MALE 76.3 75.0 62.6 68.3
FEMALE 78.3 78.1 60.4 46.4
TOTAL 77.3 76.5 61.5 57.5
Source: [Ref. 17:p. 21]
It is apparent that there are different degrees of enlist-
ment selectivity between services. "Obviously, more stringent
standards mean fewer qualified applicants." [Ref. 17:p. 19]
Thus, 76 percent of young men would have qualified for the
SEligibility for enlistment does not include the physical
fitness, medical, and background or behavior (moral) standards.
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Army--roughly three out of four--compared with 63 percent--
less than two out of three--for the Air Force. Seventy-eight
percent--a little more than three out of four--of young women
would meet the Army's minimum requirements, compared with 46
percent--less than two out of four--for the Marine Corps.
[Ref. 27:p. 79]
The discussion so far has been a brief background on
aptitude tests and how they affect military entry standards.
Predicting future aptitude trends over the next decade or
quarter-century is a massive, if not impossible, task.
However, if history is a guide, then analyzing past trends
will give us a good foundation upon which to build our
predictions.
Figure 2.1 in Chapter II presented the percentage of Non-
Prior Service (NPS) accessions in AFQT categories I through
IIIA since the establishment of the (AVF). The pattern of
AFQT scores of recruits has been irregular during the
volunteer era. For the first several years (1973-76), the
services attracted roughly the same proportion of Category I-
IIIA applicants. The latter part of the 1970s saw recruit
quality plummet due to a miscalibration of the ASVAB.9  In
9During FY 1976-80, the Armed Services were using a version of
the enlistment test that incorrectly converted test raw scores to
percentile scores. Because scores in the lower-ability levels were
being overstated, over 300,000 ineligible or marginally eligible
applicants were admitted to military service. Over time it became
increasingly clear that something was wrong with the test results,
as field commanders noticed a drop in the quality of recruits. In
October of 1980 the test was correctly renormed. (Ref. 3:pp. 24-
25; Ref. 1:p. 37]
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general, "unknown effects of external factors largely
determine who applies for service in the armed forces." (Ref.
27:pp. 46-47] However, the period from 1981 to 1989 saw a
steady increase in the quality of new recruits as a result of
President Reagan's initiatives to bolster U.S. defense
capabilities, substantial military pay increases, improved
educational benefits packages, and a growing popularity of the
military among the youth population. [Ref. 30:pp. 13-14]
Given that numerous external factors affect accessions,
the slow decline in the percentage of AFQT Categories I-IIIA
accessions since 1987 can be at least partially explained by
demographic changes in the youth population. "The recruiting
patterns of the past few years are not a direct consequence
of having proportionally more high quality applicants--but,
more precisely, a result of having numerically more high
quality applicants to choose from". (Ref. 27:p. 47] With
the larger pool to choose from, the services can raise their
minimum entry-level scores and raise the average new recruit
aptitude. Conversely, when there is a smaller pool to draw
from, minimum entry-level scores are lowered and quality
decreases.
If the past is a good predictor of the future, then, as
one analyst writes: " . . . the flow of applicants is
constantly affected by unpredictable environmental forces; but
the entry screens of the military, like the gates of a dam,
compensate for those forces by opening and closing in reaction
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to the flow and the needs of those on the other side." [Ref.
27:pp. 47-48)
C. SUMMARY
Over the coming years, significant challenges are faced
by society, and by the military force charged with protecting
that society. Our educational system has been tested and
found wanting; at least our young people--particularly blacks
and Hispanics--are not attaining standards enjoyed in Europe
and Asia. As the youth labor pool shrinks and competition for
skilled entry-level workers increases, just how far will the
military need to "open the gates of the dam" to meet its
manpower requirements? With a more technologically advanced
military, just how low can the armed forces allow their
standards to drop without sacrificing readiness? This issue
is examined in the next chapter.
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VI. IMPLICATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. MANPOWER DEMAND IMPLICATIONS
What are military manpower requirements likely to be a
decade--or more--from now? In the past, the might an'
influence of a nation was determined by the number of troops
it could muster on the battlefield. As discussed in the
introduction, nuclear weapons and sophisticated military
technology have become necessary supplements to conventional
forces to help deter global thermonuclear war. As Japan, and
modern-day Europe, and OPEC nations have demonstrated,
economic power is still at least as important as military
power in exerting influence and protecting a nation's
sovereignty. Nonetheless, the size of a nation's armed forces
and its military hardware are still used as a measure of its
power abroad.
The events of the past year--including "democratization"
of Eastern Europe and Iraq's invasion of Kuwait--have created
a new wrinkle in manpower planning. Even as lawmakers and
DOD manpower decision-makers were preparing for drawdowns,
the President was committing the U.S. to its largest deploy-
ment of troops since the Vietnam war. The ultimate effect has
been to raise questions concerning immediate drawdowns, as
well as to add an aura of uncertainty to future manpower
olanning:
56
A commitment of a half-million troops to the Middle East
was not something we had considered last summer when we
decided to cut the military.. . . We are going to have to
take another look at this and consider holding off on a
major reduction in personnel if this might limit our
options in the Persian Gulf. We will also have to
consider whether an increase in personnel strength is
warranted. [Ref. 34:p. 3]
In other words, the mandated cuts for fiscal 1991 are on
hold, and the personnel cuts projected for the years after
that time may not occur as previously planned. (See Chapter
I, Table 1.1b, for the planned reductions). On the other
hand, if the Persian Gulf Crisis resolved by this time next
year, Congress may prescribe additional, deeper cuts for
fiscal 1992 and beyond. The bottom line, then, is that force
composition and manpower requirements are a moving target that
cannot be accurately forecast--even for the current fiscal
year, let alone 5 to 10 years in the future.
If history can provide a lesson, however, it is that
tensions will likely remain--in one venue or another--for the
near future. With its obvious threat to the economic security
of the West and our Middle East allies, Saddam Hussein's
"adventure" in Kuwait is a blunt rebuke to those who thought
that winding down the cold war would necessarily create a
significant "peace dividend." The Kuwait crisis may well
confirm that the greatest external military threat to the
United States in the future could be another reckless and
well-armed Third World dictator. It is important, then, to
try to envision the military establishment that the United
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States will need to maintain to counter those, and other,
threats.
The nuclear triad is likely to remain a part of America's
strategic arsenal over the next decade or more. A credible
nuclear deterrent based upon Trident submarines, land-based
Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs), and manned
bombers appears necessary to counter the Soviet Union's
nuclear arsenal. On the other hand, forces that can project
power ashore to protect our national interests must not be
allowed to dwindle significantly. The Persian Gulf crisis
provides evidence that we must have the requisite forces to
counter conventional threats, whether in the deserts of
Arabia, or in the jungles of Southeast Asia and Central
America. Supplementing those ground forces are the air and
sea transports to get them there expeditiously, air power for
close air support, power projection, and air superiority, and
naval forces for interdiction, power projection ashore and
naval gunfire support. This means that the military cannot
afford to become a "hollow force," unable to respond rapidly
in the event of a crisis.
To the authors, the personnel cuts proposed for fiscal
1991 appear to be unlikely, and unless there is rapid
resolution to the current crisis in the Middle East, a
moderate increase in manpower is not out of the question.
Even if reductions occur in fiscal years after 1991,
maintaining a credible force to counter such conventional or
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limited conflicts will require maintaining a force structure
closely approximating that currently in place. With budget
cutbacks a certainty, innovative manpower management policies
will be necessary to ensure adequate manning and readiness.
B. MANPOWER SUPPLY IMPLICATIONS
If the need for large forward deployments declines, and
active duty military manpower strengths decline commen-
surately, many of the policies governing recruitment,
promotion, and organization will be drawn into question.
Should standardized educational and aptitude requirements be
raised to increase recruit quality, even though such changes
greatly decrease the intake of minority recruits? If the
military services can meet their recruiting goals with well-
qualified men, will efforts be made to reduce the number of
women and minorities in the armed forces? Will advances in
military technology improve or diminish the opportunities to
substitute women and civilians for uniformed males? Will a
high-tech force put a lesser or greater premium on an
experienced work force? Another issue involves career
patterns. Should more emphasis be placed on occupational
specialization, to maximize the efficiency of the fewer units
we do maintain? Or should an occupational "generalization"
be adopted to insure the interchangeability of career members
within this smaller armed force? What is the appropriate mix
of formal military schooling, on the one hand, and service in
operational units, on the other?
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of great potential significance is the mix of active and
reserve forces. In a post-Cold War world, does the U.S. need
to maintain a large Army Reserve component, as we have now-
-one which was sized to meet the mobilization needs for a
NATO/Warsaw Pact war--if a conventional war in Europe has
become unlikely?
Over the next decade, technology is expected to have a
marked influence on the armed forces. A key issue for all the
services will be the extent to which the introduction of new
systems will affect the number and character of military jobs.
Will more or fewer people be required? Will the manpower
skill mix change? Will recruits of the future need to be
more, or less, qualified? The answers to these and similar
questions will have strong implications for the policies
affecting the supply pooi of qualified and available recruits.
The anticipated changes in the population's demographics
will affect the number of young men expected to qualify for
military service, since blacks and Hispanics have historically
been less successful than whites at meeting the educational
and aptitude requirements for entry. [Ref. 30:p. 78] In
1980, about 76 percent of white men had completed high school
by the age of 23, compared with only 59 percent of blacks and
54 percent of Hispanics. (Ref. 27:pp. 68-69) Currently, it
is estimated that the mean AFQT percentile score for white
youth (nationwide) is 56. By comparison, the mean AFQT
percentile score for Hispanic youth is 31, and the score for
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blacks is 24. [Ref. 33:p. 77] Table 6.1 shows that a
substantially smaller proportion of minorities than whites
would be able to meet the minimum standards for entry into
the armed forces.
TABLE 6.1
PERCENTAGE OF U.S. POPULATION AGED 18 TO 23 ELIGIBLE
FOR ENLISTMENT BASED ON 1984 EDUCATIONAL AND APTITUDE
STANDARDS, BY SERVICE, SEX, AND RACIAL/ETHNIC GROUP
SEX & RACIAL/ ARMY NAVY MARINES AIR FORCE
ETHNIC GROUP CORPS
MALE
WHITE 83.9 82.3 76.0 71.3
BLACK 40.7 41.4 32.2 21.3
HISPANIC 52.8 51.3 45.0 37.5
FEMALE
WHITE 86.0 85.3 54.4 69.6
BLACK 45.5 48.1 13.1 21.7
HISPANIC 52.5 51.2 18.0 27.9
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TABLE 6.1 (CONTINUED)
SEX & RACIAL/ ARMY NAVY MARINES AIR FORCE
ETHNIC GROUP CORPS
TOTAL
WHITE 84.9 83.8 65.4 70.5
BLACK 43.1 44.8 22.6 21.5
HISPANIC 52.7 51.3 31.7 32.7
Source: [Ref. 27:pp. 71, 74, 167-168]
Based on the 1984 education and aptitude standards shown
Table 6.1, less than one-half (41.3 percent) of black men and
slightly over one-half (51.3 percent) of Hispanic men would
have qualified for enlistment in the Navy. By comparison,
over three-fourths (83.8 percent) of white men would have
qualified. This trend is mirrored in the statistics for
women. Although 86 percent of white women would have been
eligible for enlistment in the Army, only 45.5 percent of
black and 52.5 percent of Hispanic women would have been
qualified.
As the 18-24 year old cohort of young men "bottoms out"
in 1995, it can be expected that fewer men will meet the
military's basic enlistment requirements--given that the
present educational and aptitude criteria remain the same.
As discussed in previous chapters, this decline will be more
prominent among disadvantaged youth and minorities who may
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lack the educational preparation needed to qualify for the
military's increasingly demanding jobs.
The relevant issue is whether the current population and
projected changes in the future population will sustain the
volunteer military in peacetime. As the number of young
Americans and their technical abilities decline, the
requirement for a more technically-adept recruit is growing.
The difficult challenge for recruiters to fill the ranks of
the military can be shown by examining Table 6.2, which
follows one age group through time--excluding those who are
not likely to enlist (college-bound males), and those who
cannot enlist because they are disqualified for physical,
mental, or moral reasons.
TABLE 6.2
NUMBER AND PERCENTAGE OF QUALIFIED AND AVAILABLE MALES REQUIRED
ANNUALLY FOR MILITARY SERVICE, 1984-88 AND 1991-95, ASSUMING
NO CHANGES IN ENTRY STANDARDS (IN THOUSANDS)
ITEM 1984-88 1991-95
TOTAL NONINSTITUTIONALIZED
18 YEAR OLD MALES: 1,800 1,612
MINUS NONAVAILABLE COLLEGE
STUDENTS: 525 464
MINUS UNQUALIFIED MALES: 526 461





TOTAL MALE RECRUIT REQUIREMENT: 385 376
ACTIVE FORCES: 287 278
RESERVE FORCES: 98 98
PERCENTAGE OF POOL REOUIRED: 51 55
Source: [Ref. 30:p. 81]
As shown in Table 6.2, during the period 1984-88, an
average of about 1.8 million men turned 18 each year. Based
on past experience, some 525,000 of them were considered
"college-bound" students. Another 526,000 would fail to meet
the minimum physical, moral, or aptitude standards for entry
into the military. To maintain an active military force of
about 2.1 million and a reserve force of roughly 1.0 million,
about 385,000 men would have to be recruited annually--
287,000 active and 98,000 reserve--which equates to about 51
percent of the qualified and available pool of 18-year-old
men. [Ref. 30:p. 81]
If the Congress does not proceed with active and reserve
force reductions due to the Persian Gulf crisis--as indicated
in recent comments by the Chairman of the Senate Armed
Services Committee, then the 1991-95 annual requirement for
recruits jumps to 60 percent of the qualified and available
64
10|
population. 0 Finally, if technological advances place a
larger requirement on recruiting those who can absorb more
technical training, then the qualified and available pool is
reduced even further. Here, the 1991-95 annual requirement
for recruits would increase to about 70 percent of the
qualified and available population.11
Just as the qualified and available pool of youths is
affected by education and aptitude requirements, it is also
affected by the Census regional population distribution.
Table 6.3 shows the estimated percentage of American youth who
would Aave been expected to qualify for enlistment in FY 1981
by Census region. The results presented demonstrate that
there are substantial differences for the geographical areas
represented. For example, in the South and West only 58
percert and 67 percent, respectively, of young men and women
would have qualified for enlistment in the Navy. This is in
contrast to the Northeast and Central regions, where over 70
percent would have qualified.
10Based on increases to the active force of 9,000 and 15,000
to the reserves for a total annual male recruit requirement of
410,000.
lBased on an increase in mentally unqualified males to 486,000
for a total of 531,000 unqualified males.
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TABLE 6.3
FY81 ESTIMATED PERCENT OF AMERICAN YOUTH (18-23 YEARS)
WHO WOULD QUALIFY FOR ENLISTMENT BY CENSUS REGION
AND SERVICE, FISCAL 1981
CENSUS REGION ARMY NAVY MARINE AIR F
CORPS
NORTHEAST 81.4 72.4 64.8 66.9
NORTH CENTRAL 81.9 71.1 64.5 66.6
WEST 78.3 67.3 61.4 62.9
SOUTH 70.0 58.4 51.0 52.9
TOTAL 77.3 66.6 61.5 59.6
Source: [Ref. 27:p. 81]
As Mark Eitelberg pointed out in his study for the
Department of Defense, Screening for Service: Aptitude and
Education Criteria for Military Entry:
The proportions of 'qualified' American youth who reside
in the South--the traditional recruiting base for the
Armed Services, where pro-military sentiments are said to
be the strongest, and where most military installations
are situated--appear especially low when compared with the
qualification rates of other geographical areas. [Ref.
27:p. 83]
As discussed above, it appears that the pool from which
the services will draw new recruits is dwindling, making it




The qualified and available population, as defined
earlier, excluded certain categories of individuals. Changes
in recruitment policies and entry standards could bring some
of these categories into the pool, thus increasing the number
of potential accessions. Other ways to increase the supply
of qualified and available recruits are programs designed to
attract graduates of two-year junior or community college
programs, or to adjust educational and test score entry
requirements to tap some of the "unqualified men" indicated
in Table 6.2.
Increasing skill requirements brought about by new
technologies could well exceed the capabilities of new
recruits in the near future. Numerous ways to counter this
possible trend have been proposed, including:
- increasing recruitment incentives,
- expanding the role of women,
- reinstating a conscription program,
- increasing financial and educational benefits to attract
needed technical skills,
- reducing the level of hardship, or increasing benefits
related to quality of life issues, and
- substituting civilians for military personnel where
possible. [Ref. 28:p. 83]
Advances in technology--especially the growing dependence
on push-button electronic warfare--might offer encouragement
to proponents of a wider role for women in the military.
However, closer analysis reveals that female participation in
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a "high tech" military will be limited due to rather sharp
differences between the sexes in eligibility for a variety of
technical occupations. Table 6.4 shows the percentage of
young people (18 to 23 years old) who would qualify in the
four major aptitude areas.
TABLE 6.4
PERCENTAGE OF U.S. POPULATION (18 TO 23 YEARS OLD) WHO
WOULD QUALIFY FOR SELECTED MILITARY OCCUPATIONS BY SEX
APTITUDE AREA SPECIALTY MALE FEMALE
MECHANICAL NAVY MACHINISTS MATE 66.3 44.4
ELECTRONICS NAVY ELECTRONICS TECH 43.3 25.2
GENERAL ARMY MILITARY POLICE 69.5 68.5
ADMINISTRATIVE NAVY YEOMAN 40.5 53.3
Source: (Ref. 30:p. 120]
Table 6.4 shows that the ability of women to qualify for
positions in the administrative field surpasses that of their
male counterparts--53 percent for women; 40 percent for men.
In general aptitude areas, roughly 70 percent of both sexes
would qualify. However, in mechanical and electronic
aptitudes, men enjoy an overwhelming edge over women.
Moreover, the proportionally large differences in test scores
between men and women would seem to imply that women will
continue to be disproportionately relegated to the military's
"low tech" skills.
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Another factor may also be at work here. The continuing
reluctance on the part of politicians and military leaders to
place women in combat positions will limit them to serve in
traditionally-female occupations. As one writer observes:
Further use of this option (removing the combat restric-
tion for women] will force consideration on a subject
elected and appointed officials avoid like the plague:
exposing women to death or capture on the battlefield.
[Ref. 28:p. 83]
Use of civilians to replace uniformed personnel has
actually been going on for some time, and some believe that
the military could not function without civilians. Increasing
the dependence on civilian workers has occurred mainly
because, in certain occupations, civilian labor costs are
lower than military personnel costs. Moreover, the military
services have traditionally depended on contracted "tech reps"
to support new weapons or systems deemed to be too
sophisticated for military personnel to maintain. [Ref. 30:p.
123] However, in time of war, the ability to retain civilians
in potentially hazardous locations is questionable. There is
a risk tha . the services will become so accustomed to
contractor support that they fail to adequately develop their
own in-house capabilities. The prospect that civilian
employees might choose to strike, leave their jobs, or fail
to perform duties as ordered during a crisis further questions
their dependability. We do recommend, however, that cost
effectiveness studies be continued in the area of transferring
Combat Logistic Force (CLF) ships to the Military Sealift
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Command, where reduced-manning and civilian crews are
utilized. Savings in this support area might be better used
to support manning of combatant vessels.
Quality of life issues--including educational benefits,
recruiting incentives, family support centers, anC child care-
-remain a top priority in Congress. In the fiscal 1991 House
Defense Authorization Act (HR 4739) the committee stated that
it was:
committed to the preservation and enhancement of
quality family programs. Few factors translate as
directly to combat readiness as do healthy families that
have benefited from an environment where family welfare
is a top priority. Family welfare and combat readiness
go hand-in-hand. (Ref. 35:p. 281]
Quality of life issues that increase retention rates
reduce the annual demand for new recruits, while changes in
the occupational needs of the armed forces have made
experience even more valuable. By retaining a larger
proportion of their personnel--especially those in high skill
occupations--the services build a more experienced, and hence
a more productive, work force and save money as well. [Ref.
30:p. 127]
Strategic placement of recruiting offices will also be of
importance in the decades to come. Coupling Census
projections of population migration with historical recruiting
data should assist the services' recruiting commands in this
area. It would appear that tho:se regions with the highest
projected population growth--t_.: South and West--will have
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the greatest number of recruits over the next decade. Cost
effectiveness studies--particularly in the area of diminishing
marginal returns in, say, the Northeast, where enlistment in
the military is not viewed with great favor--are recommended
to assist in determining where to focus recruiting assets.
The Persian Gulf crisis provides a ready-made "laboratory"
for manpower analysts, and it can be used to help forecast
future manpower demands. The following areas are recommended
for further study:
1. The effect of mobilization of the Reserves, and the
readiness implications of round-out brigades on deployed Army
divisions.
2. Potential and/or perceived problems arising among
civilian crewmembers operating Military Sealift Command or
civilian-contracted ships in a war zone.
3. The impact of women serving in operational units--in
all services--during the crisis.
4. The effect of a disproportionate number of minorities-
-blacks, in particular--serving in front line units on the
media, public opinion, and, ultimately, support for the U.S.
commitment, both in Congress and with the public.
5. The impact of a protracted deployment of forces--and
potential conflict--on recruiting and retention rates.
D. SUMMARY
The balance of this century and the early 21st century
will provide military manpower analysts, planners, and
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decision-makers a plethora of problems. Of these, the
shrinking pool of qualified young ren, the services'
increasing skill and educational requirements, and an ever-
changing threat are but a few. Those who are charged with
establishing realistic recruiting and retention goals to meet
the nation's defense requirements will need to allocate
dwindling resources even more wisely than in the past. Those
that have the responsibility of determining force structure
will have to look beyond the issues of how many divisions to
field or carrier battle groups to deploy--to the possibility
of making drastic changes in the complexion of our




The last decade of this century and the dawning of the
21st century promise to bring fundamental changes to the armed
forces of the United States. Indeed, it is too early to
predict what steady-state force structure will be in place by
the year 2000. There is some certainty, however, in our
prediction that the Department of Defense's budget will be
diminishing annually over the coming years. Fiscal realities
and lessening of tensions between the U.S. and the Soviet
Union will ultimately lead to force reductions--although to
what extent is uncertain.
Further, the increasing requirement for skilled techni-
cians in a "high tech" environment will require innovative
measures to compete with private industry, and the nation's
educational institutions. Indeed, to retain near-parity with
the private sector it is most important that military pay and
benefits not be allowed to deteriorate. Ensuring that quality
of life issues remain a priority in Congress should help to
avoid lower retention rates, particularly if reenlistment
incentives--such as the selective reenlistment bonus--are
retained.
One of the defense establishment's greatest challenges,
however, will be to sustain a high degree of readiness in an
era of decreasing dollars. The strategic placement of
recruiting assets and the possibility of substituting
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civilians for uniformed personnel may help to meet this
challenge and deserve continuing research.
It is likely that America's military will be required to
meet various contingencies--such as Iraq's invasion of Kuwait-
-both expeditiously and forcefully to ensure world peace.
Therefore, it is imperative that all of us who possess an
interest in a strong defense continue to examine ways to
increase the efficiency and effectiveness of manpower pro-
grams. Further study of the labor orce, demographic, and
soc-al trends explored here wil help to clear a path for
informed decision-making in the future.
74
LIST OF REFERENCES
1. Department of Defense Manpower Requirements Report, FY
1991, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense,
Washington, D.C., February 1990.
2. Ross, Dennis, "American Military Policy Outside Europe",
America's Defense, Mandelbaum, New York, N.Y., 1989.
3. Mitchell, Brian, "World Beyond the Superpowers", The Navy
Times, September 24, 1990, No. 50.
4. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Outlook 2000, U.S. Department
of Labor, Washington, D.C., November, 1989.
5. Eitelberg, Mark J., American Demographic Trends and
National Security: Issues for the 21st Century, Naval
Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, 1988.
6. Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (FM&P),
Population Representation in the Military Services, FY
1989, Department of Defense, Washington, D.C., July,
1990.
7. Simon, Julian L., Economic Consequences of Immigration,
Basil Blackwell/Cato, Oxford, U.K., 1988.
8. Bureau of the Census, "Projections of the Population of
the U.S. 1987 to 2080", Current Population Reports,
Series P-25, No. 1018, U.S. Department of Commerce,
Washington, D.C., 1989.
9. Fullerton Jr., Howard N., "New Labor Force Projections
Spanning 1988 to 2000", Monthly Labor Review, U.S.
Department of Labor, Washington, D.C., November, 1989.
10. Personich, Valerie A., "Industry Output and Employment:
A lower Trend for the Nineties", Monthly Labor Review,
U.S. Department of Labor, Washington, D.C., November,
1989.
11. Kutscher, Ronald E., "Projections Summary and Emerging
Issues", Monthly Labor Review, U.S. Department of Labor,
Washington, D.C., November, 1989.
12. Mehay, Stephen L., "Future Manpower Shortages: Real or
Imaginary?", Trendlines, U.S. Army Recruiting Command,
Ft. Sheridan, IL, April 15, 1990.
75
13. Silvestri, George and Lukasiewicz, John, "Projections of
Occupational Employment, 1988-2000", Monthly Labor
Review, U.S. Department of Labor, Washington, D.C.,
November, 1989.
14. Mehay, Stephen L., "Workplace Skills Commission",
Trendlines, U.S. Army Recruiting Command, Ft. Sheridan,
IL, May 30, 1990.
15. Mehay, Stephen L., "Minorities in the Labor Force",
Trendlines, U.S. Army Recruiting Command, Ft. Sheridan,
IL, April 15, 1990.
16. Bureau of the Census, "School Enrollment - Social and
Economic Characteristics of Students, October 1983",
Current Population Reports, Series P-20, No. 413, U.S.
Department of Commerce, Washington, D.C.
17. Binkin, Martin, Military Technology and Defense Manpower,
The Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C., 1986.
18. Eitelberg, Mark J., "The Browning of America",
Trendlines, U.S. Army Recruiting Command, Ft. Sheridan,
IL, July 30, 1990.
19. Clark, Gordon L., Interregional Migration, National
Policy, and Social Justice, Rowman and Allanheld, 1983.
20. Shenfield, James, "New Blood", The National Review,
September 3, 1990.
21. Mehay, Stephen L., "Immigration and the Youth Labor
Market", Trendlines, U.S. Army Recruiting Command, Ft.
Sheridan, IL, September 1, 1990.
22. U.S. Department of Education, Youth Indicators 1988,
Washington, D.C., 1989.
23. Mehay, Stephen L., "Student Achievement Hits Bottom",
Trendlines, U.S. Army Recruiting Command, Ft. Sheridan,
IL, April 15, 1990.
24. Educational Testing Service, A World of Differences, An
International Assessment of Mathematics and Science,
Washington, D.C., 1989.
25. Porter, Sylvia, "Business Commentary", Monterey Peninsula
Herald, Monterey, CA, November 5, 1989.
26. U.S. Department of Labor Commission or '4orkforce Quality,
Workforce Quality, U.S. Department o- .abor, Washington,
D.C., 1989.
76
27. Eitelberg, Mark J. et al, Screening for Service: Aptitude
and Education Criteria for Military Entry, Office of the
Assistant Secretary of Defense (M, I & L), Department of
Defense, Washington, D.C., September 1984.
28. Feldman, Shai, Technology and Strategy: Future Trends,
Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, Tel Aviv University,
The Jerusalem Post, Jerusalem, Israel, 1989.
29. Henderson, Bruce E. and Mowery, David C.,The Future of
Technology and Work: Research and Policy Issues, National
Academy Press, Washington, D.C., 1988.
30. Binkin, Martin, America's Volunteer Military: Progress
and Prospects, The Brookings Institution, 1984.
31. Bureau of the Census, "Population Profile of the United
States", Current Population Reports, Series P-23, No.
150, U.S. Department of Commerce, Washington, D.C., 1990.
32. Wetrogan, Signe I., Projections of the Population of
States by Age, Sex and Race: 1989 to 2010, Series P-
25, No. 1053, U. S. Department of Commerce, Washington,
DC, 1990.
33. Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (M,RA,&L),
Profile of American Youth: 1980 Nationwide Administra-
tion of the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery,
Department of Defense, Washington, DC, 1982.
34. Sen. Sam Nunn (D-GA) interview, The Navy Times, December
10, 1990.








Attn: Library, Code 52
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93943-5002








5. LCDR A. J. Koch 1
USS Sunbachi (AE-21)
FPO New York, New York 09587-3000
6. LT E. D. Anderson
USS Wichita (AOR-1)
FPO San Francisco, California 96683-3023
78
